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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
In his dissent, Judge Desmond seems to extend the meaning of the term
judicial proceedings beyond its traditional scope. Heretofore it has applied only
to formal court room proceedings and not to informal questionings39 In New
York, by statute, the right to counsel accrues upon arraignment.40 The dissent
would give a defendant the right to have counsel present at any informal ques-
tionings which take place after indictment'
There has been little judicial restriction on the right of the police to ques-
tion an accused at any time.42 The right of the accused is to remain silent. It
is a personal right and is not dependent upon whether or not he has retained
an attorney.43 Perhaps it is a hollow right when a person is initially accused of
a crime since at that moment the accused, often under pressure from the po-
lice, does not have the presence of mind to exercise it prudently.44 On the other
hand, interrogation is a useful technique in criminal investigations and often
results in the immediate release of the innocent. Even so, the state would not
be prejudiced if the police were denied the opportunity to question a defendant
in secret after an indictment has been returned, since at that time the state has
a prima fade case and presumably enough evidence to sustain the charge.
While the position of the dissent may not appear logically justified, it
seems to reflect a general dissatisfaction with the New York doctrine as to the
admissibility of illegally obtained confessions and a desire to limit its scope.
Unconstitutionality of City Ordinance Against Lounging or .Loitering on Pub-
lic Streets
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution imposes the requirement
that penal legislation* avoid "the injustice of prohibiting conduct in terms so
vague as to make the understanding of what is proscribed a guess-work too
difficult for confident judgment .... -45 People v. Diaz4 6 called for the appli-
39. Mitchel v. Cropsey, 177 App.Div. 663, 164 N.Y.S. 336 (2d Dep't 1917).
40. N. Y. CODE CpIm. PROC. §§188, 189, 296-a, 308, 699. But see Gilmore v.
U. S., 129 F.2d 199 (1942), where the court held that the defendant's consti-
tutional right to the assistance of counsel accrues with the returning of an in-
dictment against him.
41. But see Ciceria v. La Gay, 78 S.Ct. 1297 (1958), where the court held
on almost identical facts that the constitutional right to counsel had not been
violated. But note that no indictment was outstanding when questioning took
place.
42. See Crooker v. California, 78 S.Ct. 1287 (1958).
43. In re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (1931).
44. See dissent by Justice Douglas in Ciceria v. La Gay, supra note 40
and Crooker v. State of California, supra note 41. Cf. People v. McMahon, 15
N.Y. 384 (1857), and People v. Mondon, 103 N.Y. 211, 8 N.E. 496 (1886). But
see People v. Ferola, 215 N.Y. 285, 109 N.E. 500 (1915); WGMop, EvWDENcr
§851 (3d ed. 1940).
45. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 157 (1945).
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cation of this principle in assessing the constitutionality of a local ordinance of
Dunkirk, New York, which provided, as pertinent, that
[n]o person shall lounge or loiter about any street or street corner
in the City of Dunkirk.
The defendant had stopped to converse with a representative of the Mi-
grant Division of the Department of Labor of Puerto Rico assigned to assist
migrant laborers with their personal and social problems. The local police, no-
ticing a group of persons of Puerto Rican descent standing in a g:oup together
-on the street ordered it to disperse, and when the defendant did not remove
arrested him for violation of the ordinance.
The Court of Appeals struck down the ordinance on the ground that it
was too vague to define a crime. Where loitering statutes have been upheld,
the Court pointed out, they have been phrased in such a form as 'to prevent a
-cognizable offense, as to which the loitering is an ancillary element. In short,
the loitering is used in such statutes to point up the act for which the arrest
is made, such as the breach of the peace, soliciting for immoral purposes, etc.4T
Had the ordinance contained an element of intent to perpetrate a known of-
fense, for example, the wilful obstruction of pedestrian traffic, the Court would
very likely have found the sufficient standard from which one could differen-
tiate between conduct which is innocent and that which is calculated to harm.4 8
While the problem of vagueness is one constantly plagueing draftsmen, it
is particularly important where the activity proscribed includes or may be in-
terpreted to include activity constitutionally protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Thus, in Winters v. New York,49 involving a vague itatute seeking to
restrict the publication of material concentrating on lewd, criminal or other-
wise violent material, the statute was struck down, inasmuch as it embraced an
area which included acts protected by the free speech provisions of the consti-
tution and was thus necessarily vague.
It is settled that a statute so vague" and indefinite, in form and as
interpreted, as to permit within the scope of its language the punish-
ment of incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of
free speech is void, on its face, as contrary to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.50
46. 4 N.Y.2d 469, 176 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1958).
47. The Court referred specifically to Penal Law, section 722, subdivi-
sions 3 and 8, which prohibit loitering under such circumstances.
48. Compare Screws v. United States, supra note 45, wherein a statute
which would ordinarily have been susceptible to attack for vagueness was up-
held inasmuch as it required a specific wilful intent.
49. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
50. Id. at 509.
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The unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals in the instant opinion
is well within the principle quoted above from the Winters case. Although the
rationale would not seem to be subject to dispute of any substantial legal sig-
nificance, it is likely that research would disclose numerous local ordinances
which would run afoul of the Diaz decision.51
Statute Unconstitutional for Vagueness
In People v. Firth,52 the Court of Appeals was confronted with the con-
stitutionality of a traffic law which provided:
No person shall operate a motor vehicle or a motor cycle upon a
public highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb or property
of any person, nor at a rate of speed greater than will permit such per-
son to bring the vehicle to a stop without injury to another or his prop-
erty.5
3
Defendant driver struck a child causing serious personal injuries, and was
subsequently charged and convicted of violating the above statute.
In unanimously affirming the judgment of the lower appellate court 4
which had reversed the conviction, the Court of Appeals held that the statute
neither set forth a sufficient definition of criminal conduct nor contained an as-
certainable standard by which a judge or jury could measure a driver's con-
duct. The Court pointed out that notwithstanding a violation of the statute
was only a so-called "traffic infraction",5 5 the statute's constitutional status was
to be determined by the usual rules of criminal law.5"
In construing the statute the Court analyzed each of its prohibitory pro-
visions separately. As to the first prohibition, it pointed out that any speed
would be capable of endangering life, limb or property; while a fair reading
of the statute's second prohibition would indicate that any driver who could
not stop his car in time to avoid an accident would, ipso facto, be driving at an
51. E.g. BUFFALO, N. Y., CITY ORDINANCES, ch. IX, §16, provides:
. .. [n]o person shall idly sit, stand or lounge upon or in
any street, lane, alley or bridge or park ....
52. 3 N.Y.2d 472, 168 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1957).
53. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW §56, subd. 1.
54. 5 Misc.2d 439, 159 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Cy. Ct. 1957). Accord: People v. Gae-
bel, 2 Misc.2d 458, 153 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Cy. Ct. 1956); People v. Horowitz, 4 Misc.2d
632, 158 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Cy. Ct. 1956). Contra: People v. Sprague, 204 Misc. 99,
120 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Cy. Ct. 1953); People v. Burkhalder, 203 Misc. 532, 117
N.Y.S.2d 609 (Cy. Ct. 1952). See also Commonwealth v. Pentz, 247 Mass. 500,
143 N.E. 322 (1924).
55. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW §2, subd. 29.
56. People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377 (1955).
